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 Rights Inside Out: The Case of the Women’s
Human Rights Campaign
Annelise Riles*
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Abstract. This essay traces the relationship between activists and academics involved
in the campaign for “women’s rights as human rights” as a case study of the rela-
tionship between different classes of what I call “knowledge professionals” self-con-
sciously acting in a transnational domain. The puzzle that animates this essay is the
following: how was it that at the very moment at which a critique of “rights” and a
reimagination of rights as “rights talk” proved to be such fertile ground for academic
scholarship did the same “rights” prove to be an equally fertile ground for activist
networking and lobbying activities? The paper answers this question with respect to
the work of self-reflexivity in creating a “virtual sociality of rights.”
1. INTRODUCTION
It is 5 September 1995, mid-way through the staid and laborious pro-
ceedings of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing. The delegates’ seats, usually filled only with a handful of bureau-
crats who nap or doodle through the ministerial speeches, are suddenly
brimming with anticipation as Hillary Rodham Clinton takes the podium
to thunderous applause. In marked contrast to the speeches delivered to
that point, Clinton’s is a political speech in the North American style,
and it hits its target with the delegates assembled in this room as with the
activists at the non-governmental organization (‘NGO’) meeting watching
by close-circuit television as each paragraph elicits cheers and applause:
I believe that, on the eve of a new millennium, it is time to break our silence. It
is time for us to say here in Beijing, and the world to hear, that it is no longer
acceptable to discuss women’s rights as separate from human rights. […] It is a
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violation of human rights when babies are denied food, or drowned, or suffocated,
or their spines broken, simply because they are girls.
It is a violation of human rights when women and girls are sold into the slavery
of prostitution.
It is a violation of human rights when women are doused with gasoline, set on
fire and burned to death because their marriage dowries are deemed too small.
It is a violation of human rights when individual women are raped in their own
communities and when thousands of women are subjected to rape as a tactic or
prize of war.
It is a violation of human rights when a leading cause of death worldwide among
women ages 14 to 44 is the violence they are subjected to in their own homes.
It is a violation of human rights when young girls are brutalized by the painful
and degrading practice of genital mutilation.
It is a violation of human rights when women are denied the right to plan their
own families, and that includes being forced to have abortions or being sterilized
against their will.
If there is one message that echoes forth from this conference, it is that human
rights are women’s rights […]. And women’s rights are human rights.1
From the point of view of the delegates assembled in the audience, the
speech was courageous and path breaking in its demand for action; indeed
it was action.2 (That afternoon, the young program officer for the Fiji
Women’s Rights Movement, with whom I have come to Beijing, and who
had always displayed a good deal of cynicism about US interests in the
Pacific exclaimed to me, “you must be so proud to be an American
today!”) Yet the audience for Clinton’s speech was as much her political
enemies in Washington who had denounced her attendance at this meeting3
as the delegates assembled in Beijing, and she addressed these critics quite
explicitly. Indeed, one can read her speech as much as a defense of UN
conferences as a defense of women’s human rights.4 The human rights
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1. H.R. Clinton, Statement at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing,
China (5 September 1995), at gopher://gopher.undp.org/00/unconfs/women/conf/gov/
950905175653 (emphasis added).
2. Cf. A. Riles, The Network Inside Out (2000).
3. See, e.g., C. Bogert, Women in China: ‘We Turned this Around’, Newsweek, 18 September
1995, at 50; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Hillary Clinton’s “improper” speech con-
tained “nonsensical and preposterous arguments,” Monday, 18 September 1995, Part 3,
Asia-Pacific, UN Fourth World Conference on Women; EE/D2411/S2. (Zhongguo Tongxun
She news agency, Hong Kong, in Chinese, 16 September 1995).
4. See Clinton, supra note 1:
There are some who question the reason for this conference. Let them listen to the voices
of women in their homes, neighborhoods, and workplaces. There are some who wonder
whether the lives of women and girls matter to economic and political progress around
the globe […]. Let them look at the women gathered here and at Huairou […] the home-
makers, nurses, teachers, lawyers, policymakers, and women who run their own busi-
nesses.
It is conferences like this that compel governments and peoples everywhere to listen,
look and face the world’s most pressing problems.
Wasn’t it after the women’s conference in Nairobi ten years ago that the world
focused for the first time on the crisis of domestic violence?
message seemed to strike just the right note, in the context of Washington
politics, to put her critics on the defensive. At the same time, the slogan
included nothing to generate a controversial sound bite on that evening’s
news broadcast.
The speech also anticipated another audience. As Clinton’s speech-
writers would have understood, for several years prior to the Beijing
Conference, a coalition of organizations had spearheaded a campaign
around these precise words.5 At issue were several related goals. The first
was to gain new purchase for feminist concerns by associating these with
the powerful language of human rights. The second was to gain accep-
tance for so-called ‘second and third generation’ human rights – rights that
extend beyond the political and civil rights of the Cold War era6 which
proponents imagined only governments to owe to their citizens, from the
right to development to the recognition of violence between private parties,
as a human rights violation by associating these with the popular cause
of women’s rights.7 The strategy, then, was to understand these two goals
and these two domains – human rights and feminism – as versions of one
another so that each might take hold through an engagement with the
other.8
The ‘women’s rights are human rights’ strategy has a long and distin-
guished pedigree and one of great importance to its practitioners. From
the inception of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1946,
the establishment women’s rights groups that followed its proceedings as
official observers lobbied for women’s political rights and the legal rights
of married women.9 However, the ‘second generation’ of women’s rights
NGOs which became active at the United Nations during the UN Decade
for Women (1975–1985) self-consciously emphasized a new and broader
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5. See, e.g., C. Bunch, Organizing for Women’s Human Rights Globally, in J. Kerr (Ed.), Ours
by Right: Women’s Rights as Human Rights 141 (1993).
6. See Y. Dezalay & B. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists
and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (2002).
7. See C. Bunch & S. Frost, Human Rights, in C. Kramarae & D. Spender (Eds.), Routledge
International Encyclopedia of Women: Global Women’s Issues and Knowledge 1078 (2000);
R. Cook, Women’s International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward, in R. Cook (Ed.),
Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 3 (1994).
8. Of course ‘first generation’ human rights only appear as a stable, settled category from the
point of view of the campaign to expand the category. As described in the final section of
this article, the category becomes real only through an engagement with the ‘outside.’ For
a discussion of the conflicts over the status of first generation human rights at the UN, the
terms of which structurally mirror the material presented in this essay, see F.D. Gaer, Reality
Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN, in T.G. Weiss & L.
Gordenker (Eds.), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance 51 (1996).
9. See J. Connors, NGOs and the Human Rights of Women at the United Nations, in P. Willetts
(Ed.), The Conscience of the World: The Influence of Non-Governmental Organizations in
the UN System 147, at 154 (1996). See M.E. Galey, Women Find a Place, in A. Winslow
(Ed.), Women, Politics and the United Nations 11 (1995) for a discussion of the history of
the Commission on the Status of Women and of the NGOs that participated in its activi-
ties.
slate of ‘issues,’ from peace to domestic violence to nutrition.10 What is
new, then, about the latest turn to ‘rights’ is the attempt to recast some of
these second generation ‘issues’ (most notably violence against women)
as a matter of ‘rights.’11
What is also new about the recent return to rights is the lack of con-
tention over this agenda. While the project met with some initial skepti-
cism from activists in the developing world, that skepticism has not taken
the form of any concerted organization against it. This is in marked
contrast to the bruising conflicts among ‘First’ and ‘Third World’ femi-
nists in the 1970s and 1980s over the direction of the global women’s
movement.12 Indeed, this essay must be read as an account of a campaign
that by 1995 had largely succeeded.13 Human Rights Watch, for example,
notes that governments, donors and NGOs now at least must nominally
recognize that women’s rights issues fall within the purview of human
rights.14 The campaign’s organizers illustrate this success most often with
reference to the language of the documents negotiated at recent UN world
conferences, including especially the World Conference on Human Rights
held in Vienna in 1993 and the UN Fourth World Conference on Women.15
This newfound unity around rights may strike academic readers as sur-
prising given the vigorous critique of rights and of universalism more
broadly that permeated legal scholarship during exactly the same period.
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10. See Connors, id.
11. E. Reichert, Women’s Rights are Human Rights: Platform for Action, 413 Int’l Soc. Work
371 (1998).
12. See A.S. Fraser, The UN Decade for Women: Documents and Dialogue (1987); see also
M.E. Keck & K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics, at 177 (1998) (quoting activist Charlotte Bunch as explaining that violence as a
human rights issue was selected largely to overcome North-South divisions in the global
women’s movement).
13. As described further later, the campaign defined its goal as to insure that women’s rights
became an accepted part of the mainstream human rights agenda.
14. Cf. E.H. Boyle & S.E. Preves, Sovereign Autonomy Versus Universal Human Rights: The
Bases for National Anti-Female-Genital Excision Laws (1998) (unpublished manuscript);
Keck & Sikkink, supra note 12; see also Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World
Report 1999: Women’s Human Rights (1999), available at www.hrw.org (noting that “one
concrete example of this rhetorical success is the inclusion of rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization as war crimes and crimes against
humanity” in the 1998 Treaty of Rome for the creation of an International Criminal Court
new world criminal court).
15. See, e.g., Bunch & Frost, supra note 7. See also United Nations Fourth World Conference
on Women, Beijing Declaration, in Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women,
UN Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (17 October 1995) (explicitly referring to women’s human rights
several times (e.g., paras. 8 and 9) and also directly asserting that “Women’s rights are
human rights” (para. 14)). See D. Otto, Rethinking the ‘Universality’ of Human Rights
Law, 29 Colum. Human Rts. L. Rev. 1, at 128 (1997), for a more recent critique of the
limitations of the ‘women’s rights as human rights’ strategy. Dianne Otto points out there
is no discussion of ‘rights’ at all in the sections of the Beijing Platform for Action devoted
to poverty and economic structures, and that this suggests that the campaign has succeeded
more in including women in the existing human rights framework than in transforming or
expanding the category of human rights itself.
During the period I describe in this paper, then, rights emerged as the focal
point of both an intensive self-reflexive feminist critique and a flurry of
activist ‘networking.’
As an anthropologist, as well as a very minor participant in the events
described here, my aim is not to contribute to the arguments for or against
women’s rights as human rights per se, nor is it to offer a defense or
critique of the movement – all of these projects have already been per-
formed better than I could hope to do. Rather, my interest in the constel-
lation of academic debates, people, ideas, conferences and institutions
associated with ‘women’s human rights’ circa 1995 is in understanding
how causes like ‘women’s rights as human rights’ are made, and what
kinds of institutions, professionals and further causes they make in turn.
In recent years, anthropologists have begun to address the special problems
of research into the character of late modern institutions and the knowl-
edge they produce. Science Studies scholars have learned much about the
micro-sociology of institutions within which the givens of scientific knowl-
edge are constructed,16 and others have pursued parallel insights into the
character of bureaucracies,17 of professionalism,18 and even of the acad-
emy.19 One theme emerging from this work concerns the articulation,
appropriation and circulation of academic or artistic knowledge in com-
mercial, bureaucratic and professional contexts.20 In this essay, I am inter-
ested in extending this project to an understanding of the work of what I
call legal knowledge professionals – academics, bureaucrats, activists self-
consciously acting in a transnational and legal domain.21 I take the
‘women’s rights are human rights’ campaign and the activities of so-called
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16. See, e.g., D. Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern
Science (1992).
17. See, e.g., M. Herzfeld, The Social Production of Indifference: Exploring the Symbolic Roots
of Western Bureaucracy (1992).
18. See, e.g., A. Mol, Missing Links, Making Links: The Performance of Some Atheroscleroses,
in M. Berg & A. Mol (Eds.), Differences in Medicine: Unraveling Practices, Techniques,
and Bodies 144 (1998).
19. See, e.g., T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996); P. Bourdieu, Homo
Academicus (1988); M. Strathern, Partial Connections (1991); B. Reading, The University
in Ruins (1996).
20. See, e.g., D. Brenneis, New Lexicon, Old Language: Negotiating the ‘Global’ at the National
Science Foundation, in G. Marcus (Ed.), Critical Anthropology Now: Unexpected Contexts,
Shifting Constituencies, Changing Agendas 123 (1999); G. Born, Rationalizing Culture:
IRCAM, Boulez, and the Institutionalization of the Musical Avant-Garde (1995); G.E.
Marcus & F.R. Myers, The Traffic in Art and Culture: An Introduction, in G.E. Marcus &
F.R. Myers (Eds.), The Traffic in Culture: Refiguring Art and Anthropology 1 (1995); B.
Latour, Drawing Things Together, in M. Lynch & S. Woolgar (Eds.), Representation in
Scientific Practice 19 (1990); P. Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social
Environment (1989); Y. Dezalay & B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial
Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (1996); J. Radway, A
Feeling for Books: The Book-of-the-Month Club, Literary Taste, and Middle-Class Desire
(1997); Riles, supra note 2.
21. See A. Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case of Japan’s Netting Law,
at http://www.SSRN.com.
‘women’s NGOs’ more generally as one sphere for such an inquiry. The
objective, in other words, is a better understanding of how knowledge prac-
tices are shared and not shared between different classes of professionals
self-consciously acting in a transnational legal domain.
To academics, it is largely self-evident that academic and activist knowl-
edge practices are worlds apart. In fact, the distance between academic
and bureaucratic or activist knowledge has often served as a useful
grounding for analysis – a means of reflecting, for example, on the char-
acter of academic thought through the lens of comparison.22 The divide
seems equally real for the activist community in a different sense: acad-
emics and their insights hardly figure explicitly in activist networks at
all. Offhand comments by activists about the privileged access of acade-
mics to UN bureaucrats23 or about mutual misunderstandings,24 offer some
evidence of overt tensions.25 Perhaps, then, academics and practitioners
are as distant from one another as anthropologists once took ‘Western’ and
‘non-Western’ knowledge practices to be. Perhaps we should be wary of
assuming that what motivates ‘them’ is transparent to ‘our’ analysis.
Yet the critiques of the West/non-West divide in anthropology26 as in
human rights might lead us to conclude that perhaps this concern is mis-
placed: how do we come to terms with the ‘overlap’ between ‘communi-
ties’ (a wholly unsatisfactory metaphor) as when sociologists serve as
‘consultants’ to human rights organizations or law professors become
bureaucrats? Or how do we theorize alternating motivations – the feminist
legal scholar’s self-understanding as both theorist and activist, for
example? Indeed, in practice there is such continual contact between the
two camps that it is impossible to define either with any clarity: an
academic pitched recent theory to activists by telling them why they should
care about the dominance of the state in human rights law for example;27
or a key organizational player in the women’s human rights campaign co-
290 Rights Inside Out 15 LJIL (2002)
22. See, e.g., D. Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1377 (1985).
23. See, e.g., B. Adams, The UN, World Conferences and Women’s Rights, in J. Kerr (Ed.),
Ours by Right: Women’s Rights as Human Rights 115, at 117 (1993).
24. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 7, at 31.
25. See, e.g., id. Cook concludes her summary of the proceedings of a “consultation of lawyers”
on women’s human rights with the comment that:
The consultation showed that among lawyers there must be better interaction in the work
of theoreticians and practitioners. Academic lawyers working on the integration of
women’s human rights into the universal human rights movement must be aware of how
theoretical concepts depend for effectiveness on applicability according to the rules of
practice and needs of documentation of human rights committees, courts, and commis-
sions. Legal practitioners must recognize that their work will be enriched by awareness
of feminist analysis, and the relation of practical goals to the transcending evolution of
the human rights movement.
26. See, e.g., N. Thomas, Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in
the Pacific (1991).
27. See K. Knop, Why Rethinking the Sovereign State is Important for Women’s International
Human Rights Law, in Cook, supra note 7, at 153.
sponsored panel discussions at the World Summit on Social Development
with a network of academic women from the South. One might also note
activists’ frequent use of academics’ statistical studies in their campaigns
and publications. There were even post-structuralist arguments by young
employees of NGOs produced to dispute claims about the cultural speci-
ficity of human rights.28 Some of the most interesting evidence of cross-
fertilization was a genre of advocacy that took the form of historical29 or
sociological30 studies of the women’s human rights movement itself. This
leads us to the question of reflexivity. Simply put, how am I to make
human rights accessible, in sociological terms, given that the issues are
as much ‘mine’ (the academic’s) as ‘theirs’ (the activist’s, the bureau-
crat’s)? No longer is it possible to debunk one discourse in terms of another
– to apply one set of tools (academic, for example) to uncover the truth
about the other knowledge practices (activist, for example). The relation-
ship between academics and activists also presents a problem of ethno-
graphic description. Some scholars and activists know one another per-
sonally while many do not. There are periodic conferences at which an
always slightly different list of participants assembles. Volumes of articles
are produced; speeches are made and circulated – read or filed away. It is
difficult, in other words, to describe any singular ‘community’ that might
be the subject of ethnographic inquiry here. In my previous work on inter-
national institutions, I have handled this dilemma by creating a certain
synthetic distance between my own knowledge practices and those of my
subjects. I have done so by turning away from the ‘message’ or ‘issues’
(‘women’s rights are human rights,’ for example) to focus instead on
matters of ‘form’ in institutional practices.31 However, in the hands of the
social scientist, this synthetic distance can easily be taken for a ‘real’ one.
I raise this issue in response to a debate concerning whether socio-legal
studies might have something to contribute in return to the disciplines from
which it has borrowed so heavily over past decades.
As we will see, the ‘problem’ of reflexivity was a question with pro-
found effects circa 1995 on both scholarship and activism. ‘Reflexivity’
is not just a matter of methodology however: it also has a sociology. How
‘issues’ become rights – real and independent of the analysis – and then
how these rights in turn become the subject of self-reflexive analysis – is
one means of bringing that sociology into view. The challenge, then, is to
understand the ‘reflexive turn’ as both a methodological question and
something to be observed.
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28. See, e.g., A. Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights
Discourse, in J. Peters & A. Wolper (Eds.), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: International
Feminist Perspectives 167 (1995).
29. See, e.g., Bunch & Frost, supra note 7.
30. See E. Friedman, Women’s Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in Peters &
Wolper, supra note 28, at 18.
31. See A. Riles, Infinity Within the Brackets, 25 Am. Ethnologist 378 (1998); Riles, supra note
2.
The puzzle that animates this essay is the following: how was it that at
the very moment at which a critique of ‘rights’32 and a reimagination of
rights as ‘rights talk’33 had proved to be such a fertile ground for academic
scholarship did the same ‘rights’ prove to be an equally fertile ground for
activist networking and lobbying activities? I begin with the following
hypothesis about this activity: human rights ‘action’ among both acade-
mics and activists circa 1995 occurred in two genres. The first I will call
‘human rights as project’ and the second ‘human rights as representa-
tion.’
2. HUMAN RIGHTS AS PROJECT
Those of us with the opportunity to be here have the responsibility to speak for
those who could not.34
In 1995, the women’s human rights campaign was one of the most impor-
tant activities of the handful of NGOs whose niche is advocacy for women
on the ‘international level.’ The Center for Global Women’s Leadership
(‘CGWL’) at the University of Rutgers, founded in 1989 with the goal of
relating women, human rights and violence issues, is often credited for
organizing the campaign.35 Other organizations at the center of the
campaign included the International Women’s Tribune Center (‘IWTC’),
an organization founded after the first UN conference on women held in
Mexico City in 1975 and located across the street from the UN head-
quarters in New York, and the Women’s Environment and Development
Organization (‘WEDO’) also based within a stone’s throw of the United
Nations in New York. Although these organizations were based in the
United States36 their target was the United Nations’ version of the global.
Activities centered on UN processes, conferences and documents, and in
this the human rights campaign was no exception.
Each of these organizations was associated with the personality of one
figure at its helm. The Director of CGWL was a lawyer and professor of
women’s studies Charlotte Bunch. Anne Walker, a former YWCA employee
who holds a Ph.D. in communications, was the founder and Director of
IWTC. Former New York congresswoman Bella Abzug was the co-founder
and President of WEDO. These leaders were senior, seasoned women’s
rights activists with the management level contacts at UN agencies and at
the major funding agencies necessary to survive in the highly competi-
tive world of human rights activism. They had worked closely with one
another for many years. Most were veterans of the ‘second wave’ feminist
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32. See, e.g., R.M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1983).
33. See, e.g., M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991).
34. Clinton, supra note 1.
35. See, e.g., Keck & Sikkink, supra note 12, at 184.
36. One exception is the International YWCA which is based in Geneva.
movement of the 1960s and 1970s in the United States and overseas and
had been involved in UN activities since the UN First World Conference
on Women, held in 1975. Periodic criticisms of Euro-American bias were
also addressed by assembling a geographically and racially diverse staff
and board of directors or by involving equally seasoned women’s rights
activists from different regions of the world in periodic strategy meetings.
In sum, the leadership of the ‘movement’ consisted of a small and tight
circle. I will refer to these organizations as ‘global women’s organizations’
in order to capture their own understanding of the character of their
mission.
Of course in order for the global women’s organizations to garner
funding for their campaigns ‘women’s rights as human rights’ had to have
already crystallized as an ‘issue’ – something that might be funded – in
the minds of donors.37 It is at this point that the conversation among
activists, bureaucrats and academics was relevant from activists’ point of
view. Contemporaneous with the activities described above, a growing
academic literature, curriculum and conference agenda began to appear on
the question of ‘women’s human rights.’
The central agents of these other, academic kinds of projects were inter-
national lawyers who served as experts on consultant bodies and national
governments, made speeches at the United Nations, served as experts in
the media and gave lectures at activist conferences. These academic prac-
titioners shared with the global women’s organizations an interest in
influencing UN processes to gain acceptance and enforcement of ‘women’s
rights as human rights’ and a detailed knowledge of UN procedures and
actors – the implications of different theories of government accountability
in human rights law, the possible uses of reporting systems under the
various relevant treaties, the institutional politics of UN bodies.38 This
work was not the limited province of law professors, however: there were
research “projects” as well as bureaucratic and legal projects. Political
scientists served as “gender” consultants to UN bodies,39 anthropologists
“documented” instances of bride-burning, and some academics even took
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37. Cf. Riles, supra note 2.
38. See Cook, supra note 7; R. Cook, State Accountability Under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in Cook, supra note 7, at 228;
cf. M. Rishmawi, The Developing Approaches of the International Commission of Jurists
to Women’s Human Rights, in Cook, id., at 340; J. Fitzpatrick, The Use of International
Human Rights Norms to Combat Violence Against Women, in Cook, id., at 532.
39. For example, a key UN document for the Beijing Conference – the Secretary-General’s
mandated report on “existing technical and financial programmes in favor of women” – was
prepared by an academic “consultant” described in the report as an “expert in gender and
organizational behaviour.” The Report is peppered with political science terminology and
citations. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on the Status of
Women, Preparations for the Fourth World Conference on Women: Actions for Equality,
Development and Peace: Technical Assistance and Women: From Mainstreaming Towards
Institutional Accountability, UN Doc. E/CN.6/1995/6 (19 December 1994).
as their own activist project the task of sparring with their less project-
oriented colleagues over their failure to engage with rights as a project.40
Activities for the ‘women’s rights are human rights’ campaign included
a global petition drive calling on the inclusion of women’s rights in the
agenda for the UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in
1993, panels and seminars at UN conferences in 1993, 1994 and 1995,
much lobbying within the UN bureaucracy and among national bureau-
cracies, and the publication of newspaper and academic articles.41 The
concrete goal of the campaign was simply to have the phrase ‘women’s
rights are human rights’ appear as prominently as possible in as many
UN documents as possible. The women’s human rights campaign focused
primarily on the example of violence against women, as Bunch and col-
leagues explained:
Prior to the Vienna conference, the Global Campaign made a strategic decision to
emphasize issues of gender-based violence since they illustrate best how traditional
human rights concepts and practice are gender-based and exclude a large spectrum
of women’s experience of abuse.42
In interviews, however, Bunch has suggested that her interest in violence
predated her interest in human rights by several years43 – that the turn to
human rights was a strategic means of foregrounding of the issue of
violence among many possible feminist causes rather than a means of pro-
moting the concept of women’s rights as human rights. As we will see,
this ambivalence over whether human rights was a tool to a greater end,
or a final end in itself pervaded the campaign’s agenda and self image.
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40. Consider, for example, the way the following conclusion to a recent review article on anthro-
pology and human rights takes academics to task for their “relativism” on human rights
questions:
Over the last 45 years, the world, the discipline of anthropology, and the human rights
framework have changed. […] Anthropologists since 1947 have moved from criticizing
universal human rights […] and are now expanding the scope, filling in the content,
and participating in organizations for the enforcement of these rights. The mid-century
anthropologists struggled with questions of cultural relativism mostly as a debate over
cultural values […], but changing world conditions, the clear violations of human
decency and dignity on the part of non-Western political leadership under the banner
of cultural relativism, as well as the expansion of the human rights concept – to incor-
porate people’s rights, a range of socioeconomic rights, the rights of indigenous peoples,
and the rights to development (as defined by Third and Fourth World peoples) – have
all changed the human rights problematique and correspondingly anthropologists’
responses to it.
See E. Messer, Anthropology and Human Rights, 22 Ann. Rev. Anthropology 221, at 240
(1993).
41. The most celebrated of these is C. Bunch, Women’s Right’s as Human Rights: Toward a
Revision of Human Rights, 12 Hum. Rts. Q. 486 (1990).
42. C. Bunch, S. Frost & N. Reilly, Making the Global Local: International Networking for
Women’s Human Rights, in K.D. Askin & D.M. Koenig (Eds.), Women and International
Human Rights Law, Vol. 1, 91, at 95 (1999).
43. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 12.
It is important to note that even among the group of insiders assem-
bled by the CGWL for the purpose of developing the campaign’s strategy
there were doubts at the outset about this campaign.44 The movements’
cosmopolitan appreciation of others’ confusion and even disagreement
over the campaign figured prominently in their actions.
The high point of the campaign for ‘women’s rights as human rights’
is said to be the UN World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna
in 1993.45 At that Conference, the global women’s organizations success-
fully lobbied delegates to adopt the slogan as one of the Conference’s
central themes.46 The UN conferences that followed – the World Summit
on Development held in Copenhagen in 1994 and the UN Fourth World
Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 – were something of a
disappointment in contrast as it proved impossible to secure statements
that rights to development are human rights at the former, and the ‘oppo-
sition’ was a far more organized opposition at the latter.47 Indeed, one of
the most interesting twists in the blockage of the global women’s organi-
zations at the Beijing Conference was the Vatican’s own adoption of ‘uni-
versal human rights’ as its rallying cry against the inclusion of language
supporting reproductive rights. For the campaign, therefore, a high point
of the Beijing Conference was Hillary Clinton’s metered, purposeful rep-
etition of the slogan. This was the project: the repetition of a phrase in
the documents as in the conference hall. What defined the project mode
of thinking about human rights, in contrast to the alternative to be dis-
Annelise Riles 295
44. Bunch, Frost & Reilly, supra note 42, at 97. (“Some women were concerned that the focus
on gender-based violence in Vienna detracted attention from other types of human rights
issues, especially abuses associated with the actions of non-state actors like international
financial institutions and transnational corporations.”)
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, United Nations World Conference on
Human Rights, UN Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (25 June 1993). Statements about women’s rights
as human rights appear repeatedly in that document. The Declaration states that the United
Nations is “Deeply concerned by various forms of discrimination and violence, to which
women continue to be exposed all over the world,” id., at 3:
The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and indi-
visible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of women in
political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex are
priority objectives of the international community. The human rights of women should
form an integral part of the United Nations human rights activities, including the pro-
motion of all human rights instruments relating to women.
See id., at 10, para. 18.
47. See J. Leo, A Near Hijacking at the UN, 119 US News & World Rep. 32 (1995); D.E.
Buss, Robes, Relics, and Rights: The Vatican and the Beijing Conference on Women, 7 Soc.
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cussed below, then, is what motivated its proponents the documents, the
language, the campaigns, and the research programs ‘human rights’ as a
project it generated.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AS REPRESENTATION
[H]ow can the notion that there are rights applicable to women everywhere incor-
porate the fact of diversity among women? Is it useful to develop international or
universal understandings of the position of women? Is human rights law simply
the product of the eighteenth century European ‘Enlightenment’ and inappropri-
ately extended to non-European societies?48
I also have in mind another position that crystallized in the academy around
1995. Once Hillary Clinton’s speech, an anecdote tailor-made for CNN,
is recast as the opening anecdote for an essay on the anthropology of
human rights, it demands something like the following commentary:
Human rights is a powerful term. It is the media through which a politics, a par-
ticular politics of our time, occurs. It is imperative therefore to understand how
the deployment of this term shapes the parameters of debate in a variety of contexts,
what can and cannot be recast as a fight for human rights, what effects this recasting
has on the causes and constituencies at issue.
This statement is one I would have uttered at conferences circa 1995 and
also would have recognized as a position in a debate, as the parameters
of a politics of its own.49 Circa 1995, scholars made this claim forcefully
and eloquently,50 if not without a certain degree of anguish at the concern
that in ‘exposing the reality’ of human rights discourse they might rob
causes in which they believed of their most effective weapon51 nor without
a good dose of self-reflexivity about the situated ‘politics’ of such a claim
itself. This mode of thinking about women’s human rights was more
readily associated with self-consciously academic feminist law profes-
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85.
51. See, e.g., H. Charlesworth, What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights?’, in Cook,
supra note 7, at 58.
sors who participated only rarely in UN activities and whose community
of peers was feminist scholars in law and other disciplines.52
In the classic academic statement on the question, Charlesworth, Chinkin
& Wright53 borrow the insights of feminist theory to critique the “abstract
rationalism” of international law, but also to insist that there is “no single
school of feminism” from which to critique the work of international
lawyers in the first place. For this reason, the authors are highly critical
of the rights-based framework of human rights.54 Referencing a wider
feminist and critical legal studies critique,55 they note that to focus on
human rights is to reduce the complexity of power inequalities to a model
in which possessive individualism becomes the goal, in which it is diffi-
cult to see rights as in tension with one another or as operating to the
benefit of some only to the detriment of others.56 In the introduction to a
prominent volume on women’s human rights, Charlesworth further chal-
lenges the very project the volume’s contributors espouse. Noting that “It
is interesting that there are few doubts expressed about the value of the
whole enterprise, unlike, for example, the well-known postmodern skep-
ticism about the use of rights discourse to remedy structural disadvan-
tage,”57 Charlesworth concludes that “The euphoria sometimes prompted
by the vocabulary of human rights may occasionally distract us from the
deeply entrenched nature of injustice and the many obstacles to change.”58
Lest their analysis be read to support those who would derail the progress
of women’s human rights, however, Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright
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hasten to add that rights can exude symbolic force and hence become a
source of empowerment.59
An interest in human rights as representation, then, was an interest in
the meaning of human rights, the expression of that meaning in documents
and other genres, the limits of such representations, and hence the politics
of expression more broadly. Its style of self-presentation was explicitly
self-reflexive: drawing on the uses of narrative and autobiographical
insight in feminist theory, scholars sought to make their own questions and
concerns about rights explicit, and to use these as an engine of theory. In
the final section of an article that perhaps epitomizes the discursive critique
of women’s human rights,60 Karen Engle abandons her careful analysis of
‘human rights discourse’ and recounts, in first person form, her own expe-
rience working one summer as a human rights activist and her commit-
ment to feminist and human rights causes. This exercise in self-reflexivity
(a revelation of personal experience and the commitments as well as the
anxieties it produced) is more than a crude assertion of activist creden-
tials in anticipation of the (mis)reading of one’s work by activists as an
attack on their enterprise; it is a recounting of the ambivalence that served
as the impetus for discursive analysis in the first place.61
One of the interesting features of the two genres of rights talk and action
I have described is that one could not take both positions – representation
and project – at once. Like poles of a magnetic field, they could not be
brought together. It may even seem that these two modes are opposites,
and their proponents, adversaries. It is as if each genre of rights talk and
action was unraveling what the other was weaving. As a case for a new
right emerged it was deconstructed; as a new theory emerged, its relevance
to the ‘real action’ was questioned.
Yet in order to disagree, one must first share a register of contention
that renders the conflict explicit to oneself and others. Indeed, if the genres
of rights talk could not be brought together, in participants’ own imagi-
nation, the people who took these positions moved very much in the same
circles. Almost everyone involved in the campaigns had university affil-
iations, higher degrees, academic publications. Likewise, almost everyone
involved in the circle of scholars with interests in women’s human rights
was a veteran of feminist and human rights activism of some kind. Both
‘sides’ were intimately aware of, and concerned about, the response their
work was likely to generate with the other. Scholars and activists met at
conferences, over e-mail list-servs, and where each crossed over into the
other’s terrain (the activist took on a visiting lectureship; the law professor
held a consultancy at the United Nations) and they addressed one another’s
views cautiously, amicably, directly or indirectly. In practice, there was no
explicit conflict or even contention.
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Indeed, whenever a person more accustomed to one register of human
rights talk and action crossed over into another, her work became virtu-
ally indistinguishable from other work of the same genre. Academics who
participated in United Nations programs lobbied for rights, drafted docu-
ments, or just kept quiet, but they did not give voice to the critiques they
would have mounted of such activities in another setting. A most powerful
example of this was the absence of debates about the ‘meaning’ of terms
like ‘woman’ and ‘gender’ among government and NGO delegates alike
at the Beijing Conference despite the heavy representation of academics
at the Conference and parallel NGO Forum.62
In her published articles addressed to a more academic audience, for
example, Charlotte Bunch makes it clear that she is well-versed in the
discursive critiques of her project and that, moreover, she agrees entirely
with her critics. She herself is staunchly against “trying to twist women
into existing human rights categories,”63 she points out, and she expounds
a far more self-reflexive notion of human rights than some critiques allow:
the women’s human rights campaign is simply a discursive strategy, a
marker for a set of practices, she argues.64 She accepts “the challenge to
universality” with the claim that she and other proponents of women’s
human rights are working hard to overcome First World bias, and she
demonstrates this fact with citations to poststructuralist feminist theorists
of color and from the developing world.65 Indeed, despite self-positioning
to the contrary, it is impossible to find any explicit point of disagreement
between the activists and academics working for and around women’s
human rights during this period. The difference was rather a matter of
emphasis, of self-presentation, of where one chose to put one’s energies.
As mentioned at the outset, what must be explained sociologically, then,
is this surprising amount of consensus around the notion that ‘women’s
rights are human rights’ at the very moment at which rights emerged as
a subject of critique in the academy.
At the outset, we can acknowledge the symbiotic relationship between
academics and activists working and writing about women’s rights as
human rights circa 1995. Each side produced problems or projects the other
addressed: the academic critique of the ‘universality’ of human rights gave
activists a new project – networking across national and cultural divides.
Likewise, the emergence of women’s rights as an issue in human rights
law gave feminist scholars a doctrinal hook for their effort to bring feminist
and critical race theory to bear on international law. The end points of
one kind of analysis served as the beginning points of the other. This was
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possible because each side was intimately familiar with the aspirations and
activities of the other. One simple conclusion one can draw from this
material at this juncture, then, is that the anxious choice scholars and
activists were making circa 1995 between promoting and critiquing human
rights discourse was always a false one. The one was never tearing down
what the other was building.66 Yet there is more to it than that.
4. RIGHTS INSIDE OUT
What interests me most about projects and representations as genres of
human rights work circa 1995 is the shared ambivalence that both modes
of engagement produced: at times, those who looked at human rights in
the genre of representation stepped back from the abyss and asserted that
they too supported projects. Likewise, at times, those who worked with
human rights as projects emphasized their own appreciation for the critique
of rights and their misgivings about rights as a strategy. One character-
istic of the sociality of the women’s rights as human rights campaign, in
other words, was the way each side momentarily switched positions and
looked at the issue from the other point of view.
For both genres, this ambivalence had productive effects. It was as
though the foreclosure of one kind of possibility enabled another. Ambi-
valence about rights was the very impetus for analyses of rights as repre-
sentation. Likewise, arguably the greatest outcome of the women’s human
rights campaign – the creation of “several major regional networks”67 was
the result of the campaign’s cosmopolitan leaders’ desire to do something
about their own ambivalence concerning criticisms of liberal, First World,
second feminist bias:
Just as [Chandra] Mohanty argues that a coherent third world feminism can be
located despite the multiplicity of locations and identities of third world women,
the experience of the women’s human rights movement suggests that a global
feminism driven by international feminist networking is also possible. Such net-
working does not require homogeneity of experience or perspective, or even
ongoing consensus across a range of issues.68
What work does this ambivalence do? Here we must return to some
features of projects and representations. In the campaign, as epitomized
by Hillary Clinton’s speech, human rights work was talk and writing about
itself. This ‘talk’ was not just about (political) action – it was the action:
the goal of the campaign, as we saw, was the repetition of a slogan. The
words Clinton so forcefully uttered did not ‘stand for’ an ‘issue’ rather,
they were a set of words to be repeated in diverse contexts, from document
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to document. Activists took the adoption of human rights statements as
the fulfillment of a goal, an accomplishment, a step forward. At the same
time, academics had a theory known as ‘discourse’ and a method, the study
of ‘representation,’ which sought to analyze human rights action as talk
and human rights talk as action. Representation and project were two
versions of the same representation.
Projects and representations also shared a common ancestor and enemy
– the boxed in, formalistic reasoning that dominated both academic
thinking about legal rights on the one hand, and the institutional structures
that had defined human rights on the other. For both, the antidote to this
categorical thinking was relationality69 – an emphasis on loose, complex,
multi-layered connections (networking in the mode of projects, or decon-
struction in the mode of representation), and a sense that this relationality
was the source of their (intellectual or political) power. For an example
of this shared fascination with their own relational capacities, consider the
statement of the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Land and Development
at the Beijing Conference:
Issues of women’s rights are human rights which are universal, indivisible, inter-
dependent and inter-related. They therefore encompass the whole sphere of rights,
economic, social and political. No issue of women’s rights can be viewed outside
of the human rights framework. The Women’s Conference in Beijing would, in
that context, be a follow-up of women’s achievement in Vienna at the World
Conference on Human Rights. Let us, therefore, remember that the road for women
goes from Nairobi to Beijing, but only through Vienna.70
In this statement, women’s rights are related to human rights; human rights
are related to one another; each UN conference is related to the next.
Relationality has emerged in this statement as a fact, an achievement, and
a political cause of its own.
What projects and representations shared, in other words, was a par-
ticularly late twentieth century way of analyzing problems, of which a
‘gender perspective’ is perhaps the pinnacle achievement.71 They shared,
for example, a notion of the multiplicity of perspectives on the meaning
of human rights. Indeed, it was this perspectivism that had enabled the
critical gendered analysis of the old Cold War human rights paradigm in
the first place: the activist’s campaign to expand and transform the category
of human rights was the outcome of a particular kind of academic analysis
– a critique of what is taken as self-evident, a demonstration that surfaces
are different from underlying realities.
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Ambivalence, then, was the engine of common progress, the rejection
of opposites in favor of a third indeterminate, even indefinable way. From
this perspective, I believe we can read the ‘women’s rights are human
rights’ campaign and its critique – the deployment and the deconstruc-
tion of ‘rights’ as ‘rights talk’ – as a chapter in the twentieth century excess
of representation. Here is what I mean by an excess of representation:
unlike political activism around torture, for example, where the problem
is the undescribable, unspeakable nature of the harm,72 the harms to women
that activists sought to associate with human rights were already too easily
represented – they were the mundane, casually talked about harms: the
daily incidents of food shortages, domestic violence or being passed over
for a promotion. The problem for activism was that this very over-repre-
sentation seemed to numb the activist’s audience to the harm itself. Yet
to solve this problem of over-representation by turning to further ‘rights
talk’ and critiques was to add more layers, more of the same.
What was unique about this particular academic-activist relationship,
then, was that both groups shared a common problem. Of course they
shared a sense of being on a common periphery from the human rights and
United Nations establishment.73 Yet there was something more: once
unleashed, representations and perspectives proliferate beyond their
framers’ control. As we saw, the singular stumbling block for the women’s
human rights campaign was not so much the intransigence of the inter-
national community as the divisions within the global feminist commu-
nity. As the leaders of the campaign repeatedly insisted, women’s human
rights was selected as the ultimate goal precisely because, in the aftermath
of the bitter conflicts over the dominance of First World agendas of the
1970s and 1980s, human rights was believed to be less contentious than
other agendas. Likewise, the reflexive turn in the study of rights, and the
critique of rights as representation was a response to similar divisions
within the academy – in particular to the emergence of a ‘Third World’
critique of academic international law.
Yet as we saw the ambivalence and self-reflexivity that dominated dis-
cussions of women’s human rights during this period – the outcome, I have
suggested, of a particular epistemological moment, an awareness of the
indeterminacy of things, the multiplicity of possible perspectives – engen-
dered a need to see things from others’ point of view. In a recent study
of the emergence of a medical specialty in pain therapy in France, Isabelle
Baszanger74 argues that the division of the community of specialists into
two camps who follow different theories and practices and seemingly have
little to do with one another at the very moment at which the new spe-
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cialty emerges and fights for respectability with the medical profession
must be understood as an act of self-constitution centered in the 
dual manner in which all actors involved treat a vital resource [the scientific theory
of pain] even though this group is structured around internal differences gradually
fashioned into practice, this theory, acting as a ‘boundary object’ between different
groups, is the source of its stability.75
Her point is that it is the internal division which allows pain, as a theory
and a set of professional practices, to take form.
In a similar way, the emergence of a virtual sociality of ‘groups’ of
activists then responded to a concrete political problem. The turn to rights,
and in particular to rights talk (projects, representations) momentarily,
anxiously, ambivalently resolved what was acknowledged as ultimately
unresolvable only by drawing that conflict into a debate among virtual
groups and their virtually opposed projects and representations. Rights
served as a marker, an empty box around which a more contentious con-
versation could be cautiously continued.
My claim is that the shared ambivalence generated the effect of two
groups, activists and academics, where what was really at stake was two
modes of engagement – representation and project. To imagine another
register for doing what one does (talking about rights) is to imagine an
outside vis-à-vis oneself. For participants in rights talk, then, project and
representation worked as inside out views of the same device – each an
‘inside speak’ versus an ‘outside speak’ to the other. A preliminary con-
clusion one can draw from this short ethnographic sketch, then, concerns
the sociology of ‘groups’ such as academics and activists: what these two
‘groups’ might have to do with each other is an impossible question, I
wish to contend – for participants as much as for outside analysts – because
the groups are not ‘real’ entities but rather simulations produced by the
discursive phenomenon of rights. The sociology cannot be described, in
other words, other than in the language of rights.
This leads to a final question: why rights? Why do rights emerge as
the source of a flurry of deconstructive, self-reflexive endeavors on the
one hand and of networking projects on the other circa 1995? Here,
drawing on the previous analysis, I can only offer my own conjecture:
what is interesting about ‘human rights’ is that they can alternatively be
conceived as tools – means to other ends such as women’s empowerment
– and as real entities, ontologically distinct from and prior to any polit-
ical claims or strategies one might have or analyses one might make. They
encourage the kind of double view that, in the case of projects and rep-
resentations, fueled the virtual sociality I have described. Academics have
tended to fixate on one possibility entailed in this dual perspective or the
other – either to show how the ‘real’ issues serve as the focal point for a
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new transnational sociality,76 or to demonstrate that human rights are in
fact nothing more than a set of rhetorical strategies.77 I find knowledge
professionals’ movement between these alternatives more interesting and
challenging to apprehend.
Here we should look to what activists and academics alike explicitly
say about the pull of rights. They are drawn to rights not because of their
inherent significance, they insist, but because others value them. Consider
for example the confusion about the meaning of ‘women’s rights are
human rights’ I routinely heard among the women’s organizations among
whom I conducted ethnographic research in Fiji. For Fiji’s women’s rights
professionals I knew, ‘human rights’ were part of the global agenda, and
hence to be included in their list of stated commitments if they wished to
signal their status as transnational actors.78 Women’s rights as human rights
evoked UN processes and documents, as when a newsletter simply
reprinted under the topic of women’s human rights, the portions of the
Vienna document that referred to women’s rights.79 Yet rarely did activists
describe events in Fiji as ‘human rights violations.’ Rather, human rights
conjured up images of violations elsewhere – female infanticide in China
or female genital mutilation in Africa being two common examples.
Rights in other words index the outside, the other – others’ interest in
rights, violations of rights elsewhere. One dimension of the outside here
is the law. Rights of course are ‘legal’ entities – they generally are
acknowledged to be among the subjects that lawyers and legal scholars
should be concerned about. For both feminist legal scholars and activists
circa 1995, lawyers proximate outsiders to their own circle. For human
rights activists, the legality of rights located their projects beyond their
own activities, in the realm of the established, the settled, the mainstream.80
The same could be said for feminist and deconstructivist legal scholars.
The cartoon-like simplicity of rights, compared in both projects and rep-
resentations, then, might be understood as evoking this otherness of law.
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It is the simplicity of something viewed from afar, something imagined
to be others’ commitment.
In this sense, for both the producers of representations and of projects,
making ‘rights’ the focal point takes the project outside, beyond their
own inner circle. We might say that it helps to turn their commitments and
activities inside out,81 and hence to make those projects and representa-
tions real to themselves. The ‘beyond’ quality of rights generates a sense
of an outside, an audience of lawyers, of UN Diplomats, for example, for
whom rights – and hence one’s representations of them – might ‘mean
something.’ The deployment of ‘rights,’ whether as a matter of projects
or representation, then is the virtual experience of ‘our group’ as apart
from ‘theirs,’ of one’s own community and the ‘mainstream,’ or the ‘Third
World,’ or the ‘First World,’ or the ‘academy.’ I would venture that this
is the inherent appeal of legality and hence of rights: as a marker of others’
commitments, rights signal to imagined outsiders the fruits of one’s labor,
and hence virtually establish one’s social existence as apart from those
imagined as beyond.
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